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California's New General Corporation Law:
Quasi-Foreign Corporations
The New General Corporation Law has been enacted to revise Divi-
sion One of the California Corporations Code governing the organiza-
tion and conduct of business corporations in California.1 One of the
most significant additions to the new law concerns the treatment of
foreign corporations conducting a substantial portion of their business in
California. The provision dealing with this type of corporation states
that specified California corporations laws2 will apply to the exclusion of
the laws of the state of incorporation if the corporation meets certain
criteria indicating that it engages in substantial business activity in
California.3 Section 2115 of the New Corporation Code thus represents
1. CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 682 (effective January 1, 1977) [hereinafter all citations
and references to the New General Corporation Law, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 682,
will be cited as or referred to as New CAL. Cor. CODE or New Code; hereinafter all
citations to the General Corporation Law enacted in 1947, CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 1038
(effective until January 1, 1977) will be cited as CAL. CORP. CODEi. See generally
REVIExWV OF SELECTED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, this volume at 258 (General Cor-
poration Law).
2. Under the New Corporations Code Section 2115, quasi-foreign corporations
are subject to the following provisions: New CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301 (annual election
of directors), 303 (ramoval of directors without cause), 304 (removal of directors by
court proceedings), 305(c) (filling of director vacancies where less than a majority in
office have been elected by shareholders), 309 (directors' standard of care), 316 exclud-
ing subdivisions (a) (3) and (f)(3) (liability of directors for unlawful distributions),
317 (indemnification of directors, officers and others), 500-505 (limitations on corpo-
rate distributions in cash or property), 506 (liability of shareholders who receive unlaw-
ful distributions), 600(b) and (c) (requirement for annual shareholders' meeting and
remedy if same not timely held), 708(a), (b), and (c) (shareholders' right to cumulate
votes at any election of directors), 1200-1201 (reorganizations), 1300-1312 (dissenters'
rights), 1500-1501 (records and reports), and 1600-1605 (rights of inspection); See gen-
erally Berger, California's New General Corporation Law: Close and Closely-Held Cor-
porations, this volume at 585; Comment, Californias New General Corporation Law:
Dividends and Reacquisition of Shares, this volume at 645; Comment, California's New
General Corporation Law: Directors' Liability to Corporations, this volume at 613;
Comment, California's New General Corporation Law: Prospects for Minority Share-
holders, this volume at 706.
3. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115 provides:
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a significant departure from the usual treatment of foreign corporations4
(a) A foreign corporation (other than a foreign association but including
a foreign parent corporation even though it does not itself transact intrastate
business) is subject to this section if the average of the property factor, the
payroll factor and the sales factor (as defined in Sections 25129, 25132 and
25134 of the Revenue and Taxation Code) with respect to it is more than 50
percent during its latest full taxable year and if more than one-half of its out-
standing voting securities are held of record by persons having addresses in this
state. The property factor, payroll factor and sales factor shall be those used
in computing the portion of its income allocable to this state in its franchise
tax return or, with respect to corporations the allocation of whose income is
governed by special formulasor which are not required to file separate tax re-
turns, which would have so used if they were governed by such three-factor
formula. The determination of these factors with respect to any parent corpo-
ration shall be made on a consolidated basis, including in a unitary computa-
tion (after elimination of intercompany transactions) the property, payroll and
sales of the parent and all of its subsidiaries in which it owns directly or indi-
rectly more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares entitled to vote for the
election of directors, but deducting a percentage of such property, payroll and
sales of any subsidiary equal to the percentage minority ownership, if any, in
such subsidiary. For the purpose of this subdivision, any securities held to the
knowledge of the issuer in the names of broker-dealers or nominees for broker-
dealers shall not be considered outstanding.
(b) The following chapters and sections of this division shall apply to a for-
eign corporation subject to this section (to the exclusion of the law of the
jurisdiction in which it is incorporated):
Chapter I (general provisions and definitions), to the extent applicable to
the following provisions:
Section 301 (annual election of directors);
Section 303 (removal of directors without cause);
Section 304 (removal of directors by court proceedings);
Section 305, subdivision (c) (filling of director vacancies where less than
a majority in office elected by shareholders);
Section 309 (directors' standard of care);
Section 316 (excluding subdivisions (a) (3) and (f) (3)) (liability of direc-
tors for unlawful distributions);
Section 317 (indemnification of directors, officers and others);
Sections 500 through 505 (limitations on corporate distributions in cash or
property);
Section 506 (liability of shareholder who receives unlawful distribution);
Section 600, subdivisions (b) and (c) (requirement for annual shareholders'
meeting and remedy if same not timely held);
Section 708, subdivision (a), (b) and (c) (shareholder's right to cumulate
votes at any election of directors);
Chapter 12 (reorganizations);
Chapter 13 (dissenters' rights);
Sections 1500 and 1501 (records and reports);
Chapter 16 (rights of inspection).
(c) Subdivision (a) shall become applicable to any foreign corporation only
upon the first day of the first fiscal year of the corporation commencing on
or after the 30th day after the filing by it of the report pursuant to Section
2108 showing that the tests referred to in subdivision (a) have been met or
upon entry of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction declaring that such
tests have becn met.
(d) Subdivision (a) shall cease to be applicable at the end of any fiscal year
during which a report pursuant to Section 2108 shall have been filed showing
that at least one of the tests referred to in subdivision (a) is not met or an
order shall have been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction declaring
that one of such tests is not met, provided that such filing or order shall be
ineffective if a contrary report or order shall be made or entered before the
end of such fiscal year.
(e) This section does not apply to any corporation with outstanding securi-
ties listed on any national securities exchange certified by the Commissioner
of Corporations under Section 25100(o).
4. Statutes usually provide for filing of the articles, service of process, and other
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because it is a legislative recognition of the "pseudo-foreign" (hereinaf-
ter referred to as quasi-foreign5) corporation. This comment will ex-
plore this unique aspect of the New Corporations Code, examining the
California law relating to the quasi-foreign corporations prior to the
enactment of Section 2115, the application and administration of the
new law, and some of the constitutional and conflict-of-laws problems
that may arise out of its operation.
THE TRADITIONAL INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE QUASI-FOREIGN CORiPoRATION
Corporate planners have traditionally utilized foreign incorporation as
a means of obtaining the governmental regulation or lack of governmen-
tal regulation most favorable to their intended purposes. The efficacy
of this strategem has stemmed from the application of the "internal
affairs" doctrine,' whereby -the forum court will not apply the corpora-
tion laws of its state to problems relating to the internal affairs of foreign
corporations.7 This doctrine originally found its logic in the concept
that a court could not acquire jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation because the corporate charter governing such mat-
ters was an exercise of legislative power by the state of incorporation. 8
To assert control over activities conducted pursuant to powers granted a
corporation by its legislative charter would be to exercise power over the
legislature itself, and would therefore violate the sovereignty of the sister
minimal registration requirements which do not affect the internal affairs of the foreign
corporation. See, e.g., CAL. CoRp. CODE §§6200-6804 (repealed CAL. STATS. 1975,
c. 682, (effective January 1, 1977)); New CAL. Colip. CODE §2100 et seq.
5. The term "quasi-foreign" corporation is used instead of the more widely ac-
cepted "psuedo-foreign" corporation in an attempt to alleviate the imputation of deceit
or wrongdoing that the latter term has acquired. In addition, the term "quasi," defined
by WEBsTmR's THm NEnW INThRNATIONAL DICTONARY 1861 (1967) as "having a given
legal status only by operation or construction of law and without reference to any intent
of the parties in interest," more accurately describes the type of corporation incorpo-
rated in one state, but doing the majority of its business in another.
6. [W]here the act complained of affects the complainant solely in his capac-
ity as a member of the corporation, whether it be as a stockholder, director,
president, or other officer, and is the act of the corporation, whether acting
in stockholders' meetings or through its agents, the board of directors, then
such action is the management of the internal affairs of the corporation, and,
in the case of a foreign corporation, our courts will not take jurisdiction.
North State Copper & Gold Min. Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 A. 1039, 1040
(1885).
7. Powell v. United Ass'n of Plumbers and Steamfitters of United States and Can-
ada, 240 N.Y. 616, 616-17, 148 N.E. 728, 729 (1925); National Baptist Convention of
the United States of America, Inc. v. Taylor, 402 Pa. 501, 504, 166 A.2d 521, 522
(1961); see generally, Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 1211 (1960); Annot., 155 A.L.R. 1231
(1945); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 736 (1934); Annot., 18 A.LR. 1383 (1922).
8. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839); Comment, Corpora-
tions-Interference with the Internal Affairs of a Foreign Corporation, 31 MIC. L
REv. 682, 692 (1932).
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state.9 This logic lost some of its force, however, when corporations
ceased to be created by legislative charter. Due to the enactment of
enabling statutes designed to give corporations broad powers over the
conduct of their business affairs,' ° violation of a sister state's sovereignty
by the forum court was no longer the problem it was when corporations
existed pursuant to legislative charters. The internal affairs doctrine
consequently came to be based upon judicial discretion rather than upon
a lack of judicial power.1
While the concept of "minimum contacts" gradually gained recogni-
tion as the basis of judicial jurisdiction over corporations which conduct-
ed business activities within the state,' 2 the courts steadfastly refused to
exercise such jurisdiction over matters which related to the internal
affairs of foreign corporations. Thus, state courts would assert jurisdic-
tion over disputes arising out of a foreign corporation's business activity
within the state, such as contract disputes or tort claims, but would
refuse to hear cases involving disputes between shareholders, directors,
and officers. This reticence was based on the pragmatic consideration
that enforcement of judgments beyond state lines was difficult.13 Fre-
quently, only the courts of the state of incorporation possessed the
requisite power to enforce all decrees that justice required 14 and thus the
forum court would not exercise its jurisdiction.
The reluctance of many states to apply their own laws to regulate the
internal activities of foreign corporations resulted in the removal of
shareholder and creditor protections from some states' corporation
laws.15 Eager for the revenue generated by incorporation fees, 10 and
9. See Clark v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 14 App. D.C. 154, 177, 43
L.R.A. 390, 396-97 (1899).
10. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
11. 17 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, §8425,
at 419-20 (1960 rev. vol.).
12. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court; 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969);
see also CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. §410.10.
13. See Mayer v. Oxidation Prod. Co., 110 N.J. Eq. 141, 156-57, 159 A. 377, 383
(1932).
14. 17 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIvATE CORPORATiONs, §8426,
at 425 (1960 rev. vol.).
15. For example, the stated policy of New Jersey towards corporate regulation is
as follows:
The modem corporation's business is frequently national or international in
scope; its state of incorporation is largely incidental. Recognizing this fact,
and seeking to attract corporations to establish their domiciles within their bor-
ders, most states in recent decades have been increasingly flexible and permis-
sive in revising their corporation laws.
Pursuing this policy perhaps further than any other state, the Commission
believes that it is following sound public policy for New Jersey. . . . Any at-
tempt to provide [shareholder and creditor protections] in the public interest
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knowing that other states would refuse to regulate foreign corporations,
certain states began to actively encourage promoters and managers to
incorporate in their jurisdictions. Naturally, incorporators looking for
freedom from bothersome shareholders, government agencies, public
opinion, and judicial review tended to view the states offering minimal
corporate requirements with favor, and incorporated or reincorporated
in such states while intending to maintain their, principal place of
business elsewhere.' 7  Although federal securities laws protected share-
holders from the potentially oppressive activities of the larger corpora-
tions regardless of where they were incorporated,' 8 the smaller enterpris-
es, exempted from such regulations because of size, could incorporate so
as to defeat any shareholder or creditor protections established in the
state of the principal place of business.' 9 Thus, according to modem
practice, a promoter can obtain tailor-made articles of incorporation
from the state of his choice, incorporate in that state, move to another
state, and in many cases start up a business by merely complying with
the minimal registration requirements imposed by the local state on
foreign corporations.20 Such enterprises have been characterized as
"tramp"'" or "pseudo-foreign '22 corporations because they are foreign
in a technical sense only, maintaining a substantial amount of property
and business in one state and having little or no contact, other than the
fact of incorporation, with the charter state.
In order to provide protection for the shareholders and creditors of
this type of corporation, some states, including California, have adopted
through state incorporation acts and similar legislation would only drive corpo-
rations out of the state to more hospitable jurisdictions.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A, at xi (1968) (N.I. Corporation Law Revision Commission, Report
on the New lersey Corporation Law).
16. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557 (1933).
17. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALB L. 663, 671-72 (1974).
18. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§9, 10, 12, 16; 15 U.S.C. §§78i,
78), 781, 78n, 78p (1970).
19. Corporations with over $1,000,000 in assets and having over 500 shareholders
must register their securities with the Securities Exchange Commission. 15 U.S.C. §781
(g) (1) (1970).
20. Certain corporations are in the business of arranging foreign. . . incorpo-
rations for others. A lawyer can phone such a firm, describe what he wants,
pay the fees, and a charter from any state, as ordered, will usually be delivered
in a day or so. The business of such incorporating concerns is extensive. For
example, one advertises that it acts as a Delaware agent for corporations whose
total assets exceed $100,000,000,000.
Sobieski, State Blue Sky Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 14 HAST. LJ. 75, 77
(1962)..
21. See Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 114 Ky. 892,
896-97, 72 S.W. 4, 5 (1903).
22. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. Rnv.
433, 437 (1968); Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice
of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 118, 1126 (1958);
Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955); Note, Pseudo-Foreign
Corporations and the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 1960 DuKE LJ. 477, 478 (1960).
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a judicially-created exception to the internal affairs doctrine. Upon a
determination that the local interest in the internal affairs of the foreign
corporation is greater than that of the state of incorporation, the forum
state's corporation laws have been applied to a foreign corporation's
internal affairs.23 Recently, this exception has found legislative expres-
sion in Section 2115 of the New Corporations Code.24
CALIFORNIA POLICY RESPECTING QUASI-FoREIGN CORPORATIONS
PRIOR TO TXm NEw LAw
The new law partially clarifies the judicial exception to the internal
affairs doctrine in that it provides for a more certain test than has been
previously applied by the courts.25 Thus, in order to understand the
ramifications of Section 2115 and why it varies from the judicial rule, it
is necessary to examine the new provision in light of the California law
prior to its enactment. As will be seen, California regulation of the
quasi-foreign corporation was primarily of judicial origin until the end
of World War H. As a response to the dramatic growth of corporate
activity following the war, the Commissioner of Corporations asserted
administrative jurisdiction over the issuance of securities by quasi-for-
eign corporations pursuant to amendments to the California securities
law, and maintained jurisdiction until the adoption of the Corporate
Securities Law of 1968.26 Since the enactment of that law, there has
been no administrative regulation of quasi-foreign corporations because
the law significantly reduced the power of the Commissioner over
foreign securities transactions.
A. California Case Law Prior to World War I
California is among the states that have applied domestic corporation
laws to quasi-foreign corporations to protect their resident shareholders
and creditors. The seminal case in the evolution of the California
orientation toward quasi-foreign corporations was the 1909 decision of
Wait v. Kern River Mining Company.27  The Kern River Mining
Company was an Arizona corporation incorporated for the purpose of
developing mining claims in Kern County, California. 28  There was no
23. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa S. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 821, 827, 2 N.W.2d
372, 392, 395 (1942) (modified on other grounds 232 Iowa 139, 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942)).
24. See CAIFoRNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY SELECr COMMITEE ON THE REVi-
SION OF TnE CoRO AT=ONs CODE, REPORT OF THE AssmABLY SELECT CoMmrrBE ON
THE REVISION OF TM CORPORATIONS CODE 106-07 (Dec. 1, 1975).
25. See text accompanying notes 77-83 and 97-114 infra.
26. CAl. CoRn. CODE §25000 et seq., CAL. STArs. 1968, c. 88, §2 at 243.
27. 157 Cal. 16, 106 P. 98 (1909).
28. Id. at 19, 106 P. at 99.
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indication of any contact with the State of Arizona other than the fact of
incorporation. All of the corporation's real and personal property was
situated in California, its office was in Los Angeles, and its business was
exclusively conducted in California.29 Therefore, the Kern River Min-
ing Company met the classic definition of a quasi-foreign corporation: it
was a corporation which, while incorporated in one state, maintained its
total corporate existence in another.8
The action against the corporation was instituted when the promoter
failed to convey a stipulated number of shares to the plaintiff,3 a
California resident, forcing him to seek specific performance against the
corporation to compel delivery.3 2  During litigation, the defendants
asserted that California could not decide a case involving the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation. The trial court concluded as a matter
of law that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the corporation, ordered
judgment for the defendant, and denied plaintiff's motion for a new
trial.33
On appeal, the California Supreme Court was primarily concerned
with determining the situs of the corporate shares.34 In essence, the
court was faced with the question of whether the shares were located in
Arizona, the state of incorporation, or California, the state having the
greatest interest in the corporation. If the shares were found to be
situated in Arizona, the court would be limited in exercising extra-
territorial power to compel delivery and would probably refuse relief.3 5
In resolving this issue, the court stated that the situs of the shares was
within the state where the corporation resides. That state is
ordinarily, of course, the state by or under the laws of which the
corporation was created. Defendant corporation was . . . ori-
ginated under the laws of Arizona. But for all practical purposes,
according to the record, it is a California corporation.... It is a
foreign corporation only in the sense that it is created in another
state to enjoy corporate life by permission of that state.3 6
The court found that because the plaintiff was a California resident, and
the foreign corporation was actually domestic in nature,3 7 justice re-
quired that relief be granted. 8  In effect, California recognized its
29. Id.
30. See note 4 supra.
31. 157 Cal. 20, 106 P. 100.
32. Id. at 21-22, 106 P. at 100.
33. Id. at 18-19, 106 P. at 99.
34. See id. at 21, 106 P. at 100.
35. See id. at 22, 106 P. at 100-01.
36. Id. at 21, 106 P. at 100.
37. See id. at 21, 106 P. at 100.
38. Id.
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greater interest in the affairs of the Kern River Mining Company, and
granted relief accordingly.
As the first California case to recognize the quasi-foreign corporation
as sui generis, Wait v. Kern River Mining Company was a substantial
departure from the internal affairs doctrine. Instead of dismissing the
suit for lack of jurisdiction or applying Arizona corporation law, the
California Supreme Court decided that because of the corporation's
intimate contact with the state, California's laws should be applied as a
matter of justice in deciding who had the right to the shares."9 This
conclusion seems proper in light of the fact that the defendant corpora-
tion was operated solely within California, having no contact with
Arizona other than the fact of incorporation; 40 furthermore, the promot-
er was not amenable to service, indeed he had disappeared. 4' There-
fore, it is arguable that the plaintiff would not have his interests ade-
quately protected elsewhere. In short, the corporation, if allowed to
successfully invoke the internal affairs doctrine, would have been free to
take advantage of other California shareholders. Consequently, by
granting relief, the court started a judicial trend of looking beyond the
fact of foreign incorporation in order to protect California residents
from questionable corporate activities, a policy that has now been
embodied in Section 2115.
Six years after Wait, in Stabler v. El Dora Oil Company,42 another
Arizona corporation was found to be subject to California laws43 be-
cause the corporation maintained offices, held all of its property, con-
ducted all of its business and had all of its directors residing in Califor-
nia,4 4 despite the fact that its principal place of business was ostensibly
located in Phoenix.45 The action against the company was for a writ of
mandate to compel the directors to call a shareholders' meeting in
Phoenix.40 The court hesitated to issue the writ against a foreign
corporation because the decree would have to be executed outside
California, and, as in Wait, the court feared that the decree would be an
idle act.47 However, the court was not willing to permit the directors of
the corporation to take advantage of California shareholders solely by
virtue of foreign incorporation. Thus, the fact that the court's decree
39. Id. at 21, 106 P. at 100.
40. Id. at 19, 106 P. at 99.
41. Id. at 20, 106 P. at 100.
42. 27 Cal. App. 516, 150 P. 643 (1915).
43. Id. at 521, 150 P. at 645.
44. Id. at 517-18, 150 P. at 643-44.
45. Id. at 517, 150 P. at 643.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 520, 150 P. at 644.
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could only result in a shareholder meeting being convened in Arizona 48
did not deter it from finding that El Dora Oil Company, as a quasi-
foreign corporation, was subject to California law.4 9 Because the court
had determined that the corporation's contacts gave California the domi-
nant interest in controlling the internal affairs of the business, it logically
concluded that the relief granted was justified to protect the California
shareholders.
While it may appear that Stabler was simply a forerunner of later
jurisdictional tests such as minimum contacts, 0 it seems clear that the
question was not one of acquiring jurisdiction in the first instance.
Rather, the question was one of exercising existing jurisdiction over the
internal affairs of the corporation. The distinguishing feature of Stabler
and the cases that followed is that the court was not asserting its power
because of the presence of corporate activity, which would be a thresh-
old jurisdictional requirement in a contract or tort action. Instead, it
was exercising its power based upon continuing and substantial connec-
tion with California through the maintenance of corporate property and
business activity and the existence of California shareholders. As a
consequence of this substantial and continuing interest, El Dora Oil
Company was held to be so related to California interests that its
internal affairs were logically subject to California regulation. In con-
trast, if a dispute had arisen between the shareholders and directors of a
truly foreign corporation, the traditional internal affairs doctrine would
be applicable so that the laws of the state of incorporation would be
appropriate for its resolution. 1 As in Wait, the Stabler court made a
significant policy decision to hold a foreign corporation accountable for
its actions under California law when its contacts with the state rendered
it essentially local in nature.
One year after the Stabler decision the California Supreme Court
decided Provident Gold Mining Company v. Haynes,52 an action which
arose out of a judgment against the California shareholders of a foreign
corporation.5 3  The plaintiff, Provident Gold Mining Company, was
seeking to hold the shareholders of Manhattan Securities Company
liable for Manhattan's contractual obligation to purchase shares of the
48. The court stated that because the directors resided and held meetings in Los
Angeles, the court's powers could be effectively utilized to compel the board of directors
to pass a resolution establishing a meeting date in Phoenix. Id. at 519-20, 150 P. at
644-45.
49. Id. at 520, 150 P. at 645.
50. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
51. See Annot., 18 A.LR. 1383, 1390-91 (1922).
52. 173 Cal. 44, 159 P. 155 (1916).
53. Id. at 44, 159 P. at 156.
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plaintiff corporation."4 In Provident an Arizona corporation had been
formed with the intent to conduct a majority of its business in Califor-
nia. Unlike the applicable California law," Arizona law gave its
corporations the power to "exempt the private property of the members
from liability for corporate debts" if so stated in the articles of incorpo-
ration."6 Thus, Arizona corporate law was more favorable to corporate
planners because it insulated them from liability in a manner not
recognized in California. Manhattan, as an Arizona corporation, had
such a provision in its articles, raising the question of whether the laws
of the state of incorporation would free the shareholders from personal
liability to Provident.5 7 Since Manhattan occupied essentially the same
relationship with California as did the Kern River Mining Company and
El Dora Mining Company as its business offices and property were
located in California," the court concluded as a matter of policy that
California law was applicable.59 In the course of the opinion, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated:
[W]here a corporation is formed in some state or country other
than California, for the purpose of doing business in this state, the
stockholders are, so far as concerns business transacted in Cali-
fornia, to be held liable in accordance with the California stat-
utes.60
In arriving at its decision, the court noted that any other conclusion
would permit corporations planning to conduct business in California to
escape the liabilities imposed under California law by incorporating in a
foreign state.61 If the court had followed the traditional internal affairs
rule, it would arguably have applied the law of Arizona to the dispute,
permitting the shareholders to prevail. The court's conclusion indicat-
ed, however, that the activities of the quasi-foreign corporation necessi-
tated the abandonment of the internal affairs doctrine and thus it
granted relief to the creditor against the California shareholders.
Provident extended the policy that had evolved from Wait and Stabler
of protecting California shareholders from quasi-foreign corporations to
the protection of California plaintiffs in general. The court refused to
permit the fact of foreign incorporation to defeat the purpose of the
local law and reiterated the previously developed policy that any group
54. Id. at 44-45, 159 P. at 156.
55. CAL. CIrv. CODE §322, superseded, CAL. CORP. CODE §§1300-1303, added, CAL.
STATS. 1947, c. 1038, §§1300-1303 at 2329, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 682, §7.
56. 173 Cal. at 45, 159 P. at 156.
57. See id. at 45, 159 P. at 156.
58. Id. at 46, 159 P. at 157.
59. See id. at 47-48, 159 P. at 157.
60. Id. at 46, 159 P. at 157.
61. Id. at 48, 159 P. at 157.
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which incorporated outside of California, with the intent of returning to
start up business while avoiding corporate liabilities established by the
California laws, could expect to be subjected to those laws despite the
fact of foreign incorporation.
62
While the former cases established the policy of protecting sharehold-
ers and creditors from the activities of quasi-foreign corporations, the
1940 case of Sharp v. Big Jim Mines63 firmly established the judicial
criteria to be applied in determining whether or not a corporation was
actually quasi-foreign and consequently subject to California law. The
dispute arose after a purported shareholders' meeting had authorized an
assessment on the outstanding shares. 64 The plaintiff claimed that the
meeting and authorization were invalid because of the lack of a proper
quorum, and sought an injunction against the company to prevent it
from levying the assessment.65 Big Jim Mines was an Arizona corpora-
tion, however, and in defending the action relied on the 1928 decision in
Southern Sierras Power Company v. Railroad Commissioner of the State
of California66 as authority for the proposition that California law was
inapplicable to the internal affairs of foreign corporations. 7 The plain-
tiff in turn relied upon the Wait 8 and Stabler69 decisions, contending
that Big Jim Mines was a quasi-foreign corporation and was therefore
subject to California law.7" The court, following the reasoning in Wait
and Stabler, agreed with the plaintiff and found that Big Jim Mines was
indeed a quasi-foreign corporation because its principle place of busi-
ness, the books and records, and the mining interests owned by the
corporation were located exclusively within California.71 The Sharp
court went on to distinguish the Southern Sierras decision by stating that
in that case, the corporation's only contact with California appeared to
be that it conducted some of its business and had some of its share-
holders within the state, but it did not appear to have enough contact
with California to be classified as a quasi-foreign corporation.
7 2
62. See id.
63. 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103 P.2d 430 (1940).
64. Id. at 437, 103 P.2d at 431-32.
65. Id. at 436-37, 103 P.2d at 431-32.
66. 205 Cal. 479, 271 P. 747 (1928).
67. 39 Cal. App. 2d at 438, 103 P.2d at 432.
68. Wait v. Kern River Min. Co., 157 Cal. 16, 106 P. 98 (1909).
69. Stabler v. El Dora Oil Co., 27 Cal. App. 516, 150 P. 643 (1915).
70. See 39 Cal. App. 2d at 438, 440-41, 103 P.2d at 432-33.
71. Id. at 436-37, 103 P.2d at 431.
72. The Southern Sierras court held that the Railroad Commissioner did not have
the power to approve the application for issuance of shares of stock of a foreign corpora-
tion, 205 Cal. at 482, 271 P. at 748. In coming to this conclusion, the court stated
that the legislature had no power to control the internal affairs of foreign corporations,
hence the Public Utilities Act could not be applied to Southern Sierras Power Company.
Id. The court did not state whether or not Southern Sierras Power Company was a
quasi-foreign corporation; thus, the case could be distinguishable from Wait, Stabler, and
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From the foregoing cases, it appears that the judicial tests which were
applied prior to World War H to determine the applicability of Califor-
nia law were twofold. First, the corporation,- by locating all of its
property, business and managerial operations in California, could not be
said to be a truly foreign corporation. Secondly, the plaintiff had to be
a California resident in need of relief which would be denied if the
internal affairs doctrine were applied. When these factors coincided,
California was found to have the dominant interest in regulating the
corporation, and thus the application of its laws to the exclusion of the
laws of the state of incorporation was justified.
B. Statutory Developments
The developing policy towards quasi-foreign corporations in Califor-
nia shifted from case law to securities regulation after World War I1,
perhaps reflecting the need for administrative rather than judicial con-
trol over the increasing number of foreign corporations doing business
in California. Thus, the Commissioner of Corporations exercised ad-
ministrative control over quasi-foreign corporations by regulating their
securities transactions, recapitalizations, and other activities which af-
fected the relationship between the shareholders and the corporation.
The Commissioner's control over quasi-foreign corporations devel-
oped from the interpretation of the "statutory language 'sold or issued'
in former Section 26100''71 thus vesting in him broad power over all
issuer transactions if a sale or issuance took place in California.
7 4
Consequently, the fact of foreign incorporation was not important in
determining the applicability of California securities regulations to issu-
ing corporations, and quasi-foreign as well as foreign corporations were
regulated by the Department of Corporations when a securities transac-
tion occurred in California. Further, a post-war amendment to the
Corporate Securities Law of 1917 broadened the Commissioner's regu-
latory power to include non-issuer as well as issuer securities transac-
tions because a "sale" was defined to include "any change in the rights,
preferences, privileges, or restrictions on outstanding securities.' ' 75 Thus,
any amendment of the articles of incorporation or bylaws which in any
Provident Gold Mining on its facts. In any case, the holding was disapproved prior to
Sharp in Gillis v. Pan Am. W. Petroleum Co., 3 Cal. 2d 249, 44 P.2d 311 (1935) (over-
ruled on different grounds, Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., 12 Cal. 2d 501, 86
P.2d 102 (1939).
73. See CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 532, §12, at 679, amended, CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 423,
§16, at 949, amended, CAL. STARS. 1933, c. 898, §5c, at 2316, amended, CAL. STATS.
1947, c. 129, §1, at 649.
74. 1 H. MARsH & R. VoLY, PRACrCE UNDER THE CALiORNmA SEcUlUTEs LAW,
§1.03[2][a] (1975) [hereinafter cited as I MARSH & VOLK].
75. 1 MARSH & VoLK, supra note 74, §1.03[3][d].
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way affected the rights of shareholders or creditors was subject to the
approval of the Commissioner of Corporations. 8 In effect, the 1947
amendment to the Corporate Securities Law constituted an assumption
of administrative control over the internal affairs of both foreign and
quasi-foreign corporations.
Corporate planners criticized the amended Corporate Securities Law
as an improper interference with the rights vested in shareholders under
the laws of the state of incorporation. This criticism culminated with
that 1961 appellate court decision of Western Air Lines v. Sobieski.77 In
Western Air Lines, the Commissioner of Corporations declared that he
had the power to compel a foreign corporation doing a majority of its
business, but having only 30 percent of its shares held by California
residents, to comply with regulations concerning the issuance of permits
for the "sale" of securities within the state.78 Since Western Air Lines,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, was attempting to eliminate cumulative
voting from its articles, as permitted by Delaware but prohibited by
California, the Commissioner felt that a change in the "rights, privileges,
preferences and restrictions" was taking place such that there was a
"sale" of securities.79 Hence, he asserted jurisdiction and refused to
issue a securities permit.8 0 It is important to note that Western Air
Lines, Inc., did not meet the judicial criteria previously established for
determining whether a foreign corporation had acquired a quasi-foreign
status. It had substantial contacts with other states, less than half of its
shares were held by California residents,"' and the action against the
Commissioner to compel issuance of a securities permit had been
brought by the corporation. 2 Nevertheless, the court concluded that a
holding for Western Air Lines "would enable a foreign corporation to
destroy the rights which the State of California has deemed worthy of
protection by the enactment of the Corporate Securities Act."8" This
statement represented the policy California courts had been developing
since 1902 in Wait v. Kern River Mining. Whereas the previous
76. Id.
77. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
78. Id. at 402-03, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22; see generally Sobieski, Securities Regula-
tion in California: Recent Developments, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1963); Sobieski, State
Blue Sky Turisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 14 Ht&sT. L. 75 (1962); Note, Corpo-
rations: Sales of Securities: Foreign Corporations Denied Permit to Eliminate Cumula-
tive Voting for Directors, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 242 (1962); Note, Corporations: Share-
holders' Rights and the Foreign Corporation-Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski (Cal.
App. 1961), 49 CAL. L. REV. 974 (1961).
79. 191 Cal. App. 2d at 403, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22.
80. Id. at 403, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
81. Id. at 402, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
82. Id. at 404, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
83. Id. at 413-14, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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decisions may have been rationalized as being applicable to high risk
mining ventures, with a concomitant state interest in protecting Califor-
nia shareholders from questionable practices, the Western Air Lines
decision indicated that the policy underlying those decisions was clearly
not limited to speculative business corporations, but was applicable to
any foreign corporation intending to carry on a substantial portion of its
business activity within California.
The Western Air Lines decision caused considerable consternation
among corporate planners, who questioned the logic of making the
application of California's securities regulation turn upon the location of
a corporation's business activity."4 While the earlier cases had dealt
with corporations doing substantially all of their business in California,
the Western Air Lines decision made the standard for determining
whether a corporation had attained quasi-foreign status far too nebu-
lous. Unlike the earlier cases which involved corporations having sub-
stantially all of their property, business, and shareholders in California,
the Western Air Lines court found that only 30 percent of Western's
shares were registered to owners with California addresses and that a
"substantial" portion of its business was conducted within the state. 5
The court's decision consequently broadened the concept of the quasi-
foreign corporation, and caused corporate managers and promoters to
urge the legislature to supply a more definite and precise test as to when
jurisdiction would be exercised by California over securities transac-
tions.8  As a result, when the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 was
enacted, the draftsmen determined that the only factor logically rele-
vant to foreign securities regulation was the residence of the share-
holders of the issuing corporationY8 1 At this juncture, it was argued
that the purpose of the law was to protect such shareholders from fraud
rather than to regulate the business operations of the corporation. 8
Consequently, Section 25103,89 which prohibited the Commissioner
of Corporations from asserting jurisdiction over any foreign corporation
regardless of its business activity within California unless at least 25
percent of its shares were held by persons having California addresses,
was included as a part of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968. With
this change, the judicial concept of the quasi-foreign corporation was
abolished and replaced with a shareholder residence test as the sole
84. See 1 MARSH & VoLK, supra note 74, §7.06[3].
85. 191 Cal. App. 2d at 402, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
86. See 1 MARSH & VoLK, supra note 74, at §7.06[3].
87. Id. at §7.06[3].
88. Id. at 224.
89. CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 88, §2 at 253-54.
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determinative factor regarding -the applicability of California securities
regulations to foreign corporations.90
While foreign incorporation would not have been an effective way
to evade California regulations if one wished to sell securities prior to
1968 due to the broad regulatory power of the Commissioner of Cor-
porations over all corporations, exemptions in the Corporate Securities
Law of 196891 have permitted small and intermediate-sized quasi-
foreign corporations -to completely avoid the application of California
laws. For example, the small-offering exemption92 permits a non-public
offering (an offer to not more than 25 persons) 98 for the sale of securi-
ties to be made without obtaining an issuance certificate from the Com-
missioner of Corporations, thus bypassing his regulatory authority. The
availability of this exemption apparently rests on the assumption that
there is an insufficient state interest in securities transactions involving
less than 25 persons to warrant extensive regulation by the Commis-
sioner of Corporations. However, there has been a tremendous in-
crease in application requests since 1968, indicating that there are many
small corporations issuing securities without regulatory supervision.
In 1975 the application rate for securities issuance permits was approxi-
mately 460 applications per month.94 In contrast, the number of
small-offering qualification applications was approximately 1350 per
month, and there is an indication that this trend is increasing.95 While
there are no statistics available from the Secretary of State or the Fran-
chise Tax Board, extrapolations from a 1966 survey conducted by the
Department of Corporations96 indicate that at least ten percent of the
applications come from foreign corporations. Thus, there may be
approximately 135 foreign corporations per month seeking to issue
securities in California under circumstances which preclude the appli-
cation of California securities regulations. It is submitted that this
significant number of corporations not subject to regulation under the
old law indicates the basic purpose of Section 2115 of the General Cor-
poration Law of 1975: to subject these corporations to minimal Cali-
fornia regulatory standards in order to afford some degree of protec-
tion to California shareholders and creditors.
90. 1 MARSH & VOLK, supra note 74, at §7.06[4], [5].
91. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§25102, 25103.
92. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(a).
93. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.102.1.
94. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS, QUALIFICATIONS & REG-
ISTRATION DVsIoN, REPORT OF ACTnVInS FOR TIE STATE (Jan. 1975-Dec. 30, 1975).
95. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS, QUALIFICATION &
REGISTRATION DVsION, REPORT OF AcTVITs FOR THE STATE (Jan. 1970-Dec. 30,
1970).
96. Interview with Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, Sacramento, Califor-
nia, October 27, 1975.
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APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 2115
Section 2115 of the New General Corporation Law once more injects
the concept of the quasi-foreign corporation into California law.07 This
section specifies that foreign corporations meeting certain criteria will be
subject to specified provisions of the New California Corporations Code
to the exclusion of the laws of the state of incorporation. 8 However,
the provision embodies a legislative rather than judicial or administrative
determination that California has the dominant interest in regulating
foreign corporations with half or more of its voting securities registered
to addresses within the state. "' Furthermore, it reflects the concern that
a number of small and intermediate-sized corporations have effectively
evaded California supervision since the enactment of the Corporate
Securities Law of 1968. At the outset, it should be emphasized that
Section 2115 does not apply to corporations with outstanding securities
listed on a national securities exchange certified by the Commissioner of
Corporations. 100 Except for this restriction, any corporation incorpo-
rated in a state other than California which meets a three-factor formula
and which has 50 percent of its voting securities registered to owners
with California addresses will be subject to Section 2115.
A. The Three-Factor I ormula
Departing from the nebulous test used in the Western Air Lines case
to determine the extent of the corporation's contact with California,
Section 2115 has adopted a specific three-factor formula from the
Revenue and Taxation Code as a measure of a foreign corporation's
business activity.101 Whereas the cases prior to Western Air Lines dealt
with foreign corporations maintaining all of their property, payroll and
business in California, and whereas Western Air Lines conducted a
substantial amount of business activity within California, Section 2115
strikes a balance by providing a test which appears relatively simple to
apply and yet precisely determines the amount of business a foreign
corporation carries on within the state.
The first factor to be considered in evaluating the extent of the corpo-
ration's contact with California is the property factor, which is deter-
97. See note 3 supra.
98. See note 2 supra.
99. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115(a).
100. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115(e) provides "'This section does not apply to
any corporation with outstanding securities listed on any national securities exchange
certified by the Commissioner of Corporations under Section 25100(o)." The apparent
purpose for this exception is to avoid regulating corporations already subject to federal
securities laws. Evidently, those laws protect shareholders adequately enough without
resort to California regulation.
101. New CAl. CORP. CODE §2115(a).
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mined by dividing the average value of the corporation's real and per-
sonal property owned or rented and used within California'02 by the av-
erage value of the total amount of real and personal property owned or
rented and used, by the corporation.' The payroll factor is computed
in the same manner as the property factor: the payroll paid in California
to employees of the corporation is divided by the total payroll paid by
the corporation. 0 4 Finally, the sales factor is determined by dividing the
gross sales of the corporation within California by its total gross sales.10 5
These separate averages are combined and averaged for the final deter-
mination of business contact within the state, and if the final average
exceeds 50 percent, the foreign corporation is deemed to have such
substantial contacts with California that, if the shareholder residence test
is met, it is subject to certain provisions of California law.' 0 6
Because the purpose of the three-factor formula is to accurately reflect
the degree of business activity conducted in California by a foreign
corporation, a slightly different test is necessary to take into account the
effect of minority interests in subsidiary corporations not wholly owned
by the parent. It appears that if a subsidiary's activity were not appor-
tioned to take into account these minority interests, the degree of parent
activity would be unnecessarily distorted, resulting in either too much or
not enough regulation. Thus, the factors for the parent and the subsidi-
ary are to be computed together, eliminating any inter-company transac-
tions, and the percentage of minority ownership of the subsidiary is to
be deducted.'07 If, for example, the total factor average. is 80 percent
and the minority ownership is 25 percent, 25 percent will be subtracted
from the total average and the final average will be 55 percent. In
general, when the three-factor formula is applied to a corporation with
subsidiary companies, only the proportion of property, payroll, and sales
equal to the percentage of shares owned by the parent is to be consid-
ered in determining the degree of contact the corporation has with
California.
B. The Shareholder Resident Test
In addition to providing the three-factor formula, Section 2115
102. The average value of the corporation's property is as follows:
(1) Property owned by the corporation is valued at its cost,
(2) Property rented by the corporation is valued at eight times the net annual
rental rate.
See CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§25130, 25131.
103. This language is derived from CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §25129.
104. See CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §25132.
105. See CA. REv. & TAX. CODE §25134.
106. See note 3 supra.
107. New CAL. CoP. CODE 62115(a).
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specifies that over one-half of the corporation's outstanding voting
securities must be held of record by persons having addresses within
California before the corporation will be subject to California regula-
tion. The purpose of Section 2115 is to protect shareholders and
creditors residing in California from nefarious business activities of
quasi-foreign corporations. While the three-factor formula arguably
leans towards protecting creditors because of the business activity it
registers, the shareholder residence test appears to be designed to
further a policy of protecting California shareholders as well. 108 Thus,
when less than half of a corporation's shares are held by California
residents, the legislature has determined that there exists an insufficient
state interest to justify adherence to California corporation laws. It
should be noted, however, that the Corporate Securities Law of 1968
remains applicable to foreign corporations with more than 25 percent of
their securities registered to California residents,1"' arguably providing a
less onerous regulatory scheme as the state interest diminishes.""
In counting the number of shares outstanding for the purposes of
determining the residence of the shareholders, shares held in the name
of broker-dealers or nominees of broker-dealers are not to be count-
ed."' This provision apparently protects foreign corporations from
being unjustifiably subjected to California law because of a large num-
ber of shares held by broker-dealers in California, and assures that the
California shareholders have a sufficient protectible interest by measur-
ing their interest in the corporation against the interest of all other
shareholders."1
2
In view of the fact that Section 2115 is directed at protecting Califor-
nia shareholders and creditors," 3 it seems appropriate that the corpora-
tion have a sufficient number of California shares before being required
to comply with California regulations. However, it should be noted that
the shareholder residence test may be defeated by the execution of a
voting trust agreement in a jurisdiction other than California. Because
108. See I MARSH & VoLx, supra note 74, at §7.06[4], [5].
109. CAL. CORP. CODE §25103(b), (c).
110. Regulation under securities laws is less onerous because securities transactions
occur less frequently than other types of corporate activities. Consequently, it appears
that a foreign corporation with less than 50 percent but more than 25 percent of its
shares held by persons having California addresses will not be subject to the provisions
regulating corporate internal affairs, but will be subject to securities laws whenever appli-
cable.
111. New CAL. Copn,. CODE §2115(a).
112. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115(a).
113. CALiFoP, NL LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITrEE ON THE REVISION OF
THE CORPORATIONS CODE, REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT CoMMrrrEE ON THE RE-
VISION oF THE CORPOAnoNs CODE 106 (Dec. 1, 1975); see generally Comment, Cali-
fornia's New General Corporation Law: Prospects for Minority Shareholders, this
volume at 706 (concerning minority shareholders).
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the shareholder of record would be a trustee outside of California, the
records of the corporation would show less than 50 percent of its
securities as belonging to California residents. Should this occur, it
seems arguable that California would no longer have a substantial
interest in protecting its resident shareholders, negating the application
of Section 2115 to the foreign corporation."14
C. Administration of Section 2115
One of the problems with the f6rmer judicial and administrative
approach to regulation of quasi-foreign corporations was that a foreign
corporation could never ascertain when California law would be deemed
applicable, and furthermore, what would happen in the event that the
corporation ceased having substantial California contacts. While the
three-factor formula and the shareholder residence test embodied in the
New Code appear to simplify questions concerning the initial application
of California laws to foreign corporations, Section 2115 also establishes
the administrative procedures necessary to alleviate uncertainty as to the
continuing applicability of California law to the foreign and quasi-
foreign corporation.
A foreign corporation must file an annual statement with the Secre-
tary of State on a form supplied by that office' 5 if it has qualified to
transact intrastate business within California.16 The statement must
include the percentage of the corporation's outstanding voting securities
held of record as of the last shareholders' meeting by .persons having
California addresses,117 and some indication as to the amount of busi-
ness conducted in California."18 The latter requirement may be met by
stating that all of the income of the corporation was taxable for Califor-
nia franchise tax purposes, or would have been taxable had there been
sufficient income to tax, or alternatively, by stating the property, payroll
and sales factors as computed under Section 2115."9 The effect of this
report is not to have any bearing on the corporation's method of
preparing reports of its income for franchise tax purposes. 12 0  The
114. On the other hand, it seems reasonable that beneficial shareholders require the
same protections as legal shareholders. Thus, a court could possibly look to substance
over form and find that a voting trust may not defeat the shareholder residence test
115. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2108.
116. A foreign corporation qualifies to transact intrastate business by procuring a
certificate from the secretary of state pursuant to Section 2105 of the G0eneral Corpora-
tion Law of 1975. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2105.
117. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
118. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2108(a).
119. See text accompanying notes 101-105 supra.
120. Thus, the Franchise Tax Board apparently cannot press a foreign corporation
to explain inconsistencies between the Section 2108 statement and the franchise tax re-
turn. This may reflect a recognition of the fact that separate books kept for tax pur-
poses will not accurately reflect the corporation's contact with California.
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failure of a foreign corporation to file a statement under Section 2108 of
the New Code within six months after notice has been given that the
statement is delinquent will result in the Secretary of State forfeiting the
right of the corporation to transact intrastate business in California. 12 1
A foreign corporation is subject to California law only after the
Section 2108 statement shows, or a court of competent jurisdiction after
a judicial review of the facts finds, that the Section 2115 tests have been
met.122 If the corporation is uncertain as to the applicability of Section
2115 upon an original filing of a Section 2108 statement, it presumably
may file an action for declaratory relief against the Secretary of State to
obtain a judicial ruling on the Section 2115 tests. If during the fiscal
year in which the Section 2108 statement has been filed a foreign
corporation believes that it no longer meets the criteria in Section
2 115(a), it may submit a later Section 2108 statement indicating the
change in status, or it may file an action for declaratory relief alleging
that one. of the tests is no longer met.123  In any case, if the Section
2115 tests are met, a corporation will become subject to California law
on the first day of its first fiscal year2 4 in California, which commences
on or after the 30th day past the date of the filing of the statement.
A foreign corporation is subject to Section 2115 until its fiscal year
has ended, and either a subsequent statement has been filed, or a court
order procured showing that at least one of the Section 2115 tests is no
longer met. However, if a contrary statement or court order is filed
before the end of the fiscal year, a prior finding that the corporation is
not subject to Section 2115 will be ineffective.'12  The effect of this rule
is to subject a foreign corporation to Section 2115 for at least one fiscal
year if it originally qualifies under the Section 2115 tests. The corpora-
tion will not be able to disqualify itself until the end of the fiscal year,
eliminating any uncertainty as to the application of Section 2115. To
alleviate uncertainty beyond the current fiscal year, the corporation may
seek a court order stating that, as of the next fiscal year, California law
will no longer be applicable to it.120
In summary, Section 2115 provides a reasonably certain and definite
test as to when foreign corporations will be subject to California corpo-
121. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2108(d).
122. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §2115(c).
123. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115(d).
124. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115(c). "First fiscal year" refers to the first year
of operation in California. While the corporation may be running on another fiscal
year for tax or accounting purposes, its fiscal year for regulatory purposes begins 30 days
after the Section 2108 statement has been filed.
125. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115(d).
126. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115(d).
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ration laws by utilizing a three-factor formula and a shareholder resi-
dence test as measures of state interest in regulating the corporation's
internal affairs. In addition, the corporation is subject to Section 2115
for at least one year after it files a Section 2108 statement showing that
both tests have been met, but may, during that year, take action to
relieve itself of California regulation by filing another Section 2108
statement or obtaining declaratory relief indicating that one of the tests
is no longer met. By providing an apparently simple and thorough
determination of state interest in foreign corporations, the legislature
seems to have resolved the uncertainties which arose after the Western
Air Lines decision, while maintaining a modicum of protection for
California shareholders and creditors.
CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
Section 2115 represents a radical departure from the usual state
corporation law provisions because it, in effect, converts a corporation
incorporated in State X into a California corporation for certain purpos-
es. This legal metamorphosis, based on the rationale that California has
the dominant interest in regulating quasi-foreign corporations, raises
potential constitutional obstacles. While an exhaustive analysis of the
constitutional issues raised by Section 2115 is beyond the scope of this
comment, the following discussion will attempt to highlight some of the
major questions posed by the application of California law to quasi-
foreign corporations.
In general, the states' power to regulate foreign corporations has been
limited by five constitutional doctrines, including prohibitions against
the imposition of an "unconstitutional condition!' on foreign corpora-
tions seeking admission to do business in a state, the creation of a
burden on interstate commerce, the violation of due process standards,
the violation of the full faith and credit clause, and the violation of the
foreign corporation's right to equal protection. Although there have
been no cases concerning the constitutional ability of a state to regulate
the internal affairs of quasi-foreign corporations, decisions regarding
each of the five limitations on the states' power to regulate foreign
corporations may be examined and applied to Section 2115 to indicate
how the section might fare if subjected to constitutional challenge in the
courts.
A. The Doctrine of "Unconstitutional Conditions"
Section 2115 imposes a condition upon the admittance of quasi-
foreign corporations to do business in California by requiring them to
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comply with specified provisions of the New California Corporations
Code.127 This condition is more onerous than the typical qualification
provisions regarding registration and taxation of foreign corporations,
because it establishes a minimum level of corporate conduct that must
be adhered to for the privilege of doing business in California. The
ultimate issue thus concerns the power of a state to limit or condition
entry of foreign corporations into intrastate business. It is well settled
that a state has broad power to exclude or admit foreign corporations
wishing to do business within its territory; 28 however, that power is
limited to the extent that the conditions imposed by the state cannot be
unconstitutional. 12 9 The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"'180
consequently prohibits a state from imposing any condition on a foreign
corporation that would require the corporation to surrender a constitu-
tional or congressionally granted right for the privilege of doing business
within the state.'31 The doctrine has typically been expressed when a
foreign corporation has been given permission to do business in a state
only after it has agreed not to remove actions to federal court.'3 2
Because the state requires the corporation to give up a right granted to
all citizens by Congress, its statute is said to be "repugnant to the
Constitution and laws of the United States" and is therefore invalid as an
unconstitutional condition to admittance.8 3 With respect to Section
2115, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions would arguably apply
only if a Constitutional or Congressionally-granted right was given up
for the privilege of doing business in California. It appears that, while the
quasi-foreign corporation may be giving up privileges accorded it by the
state of incorporation, they are only privileges and not federal rights.
Consequently, conditions imposed on the admission of foreign corpora-
tions, which, because of their contact with California, will be subject to
California law, appear to be constitutionally valid.
B. Commerce Clause Ramifications
It is well established that a state cannot interfere with interstate
127. See note 3 supra.
128. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 181 (1868); Kaplan, Foreign Corporations
and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433, 443 (1968).
129. G. HENDERSON, THE PosrMON OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CON-
STTrTONAL LAw 134 (1918) thereinafter cited as HENDERSON].
130. For a discussion of the doctrine of "unconstitutional condition," see id. at 132-
47
131. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 455-57 (1874), Layfayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1855), 87 U.S. at 454-55.
132. See id. at 454, 457; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.562, 571 (1949);
State of Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361,
365 (1933); Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235, 241 (1929); Hanover
Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 507 (1926).
133. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 455, 457 (1874).
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commerce in regulating foreign corporations,13 4 and local qualification
provisions have been challenged on this basis.'3 5 The requirement that
a foreign corporation conducting solely interstate commerce register in a
state in which it does business has been said to be invalid because it
subjects interstate commerce to local regulation.8 6 Consequently, Sec-
tion 2115, if applied to a corporation conducting solely interstate busi-
ness, may transgress the Commerce Clause insofar as it would subject
such a corporation to local corporation laws.
To determine the applicability of Section 2115 to interstate corpora-
tions, one must look to Section 2100 of the New Code which states that
the provisions of Chapter 21 relating generally to foreign corporations
and including Section 2115, are applicable only to foreign corporations
"transacting intrastate business" in California except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided. 37  "Transacting intrastate business" is defined 8 8 to
mean that a foreign corporation enters into "repeated and successive
transactions of its business" in California, expressly excluding interstate
or foreign commerce as being intrastate in nature. 39 Thus, from the
definitional language of the statute, it appears that purely interstate
corporations that transact no "intrastate" business in California as de-
fined in the New Code are not subject to California law.
Under California's definition of interstate corporations, corporations
that conduct business in other states, as well as in California, are treated
as intrastate in nature, a fact that directs the present inquiry to the issue
of whether Section 2115, by inhibiting such foreign corporations from
transacting business in California for fear of being subject to California
regulation, burdens interstate commerce. The United States Supreme
Court has applied a balancing test when examining state statutes that
regulate intra- and interstate commerce, and has held that:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.' 40
134. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 278 (1961); Note,
State Regulation of Foreign Corporations: Qualifications: Interstate v. Intrastate Busi-
ness: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961) 47 CORNELL L.Q. 300,
301-02 (1962).
135. See 366 U.S. at 277.
136. See id. at 278; Note, State Regulation of Foreign Corporations: Qualifications:
Interstate v. Intrastate Business: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276
(1961), 47 CoRNELL LQ. 300, 301-02 (1962).
137. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2100.
138. New CAL. CORP. CODE §191(a).
139. New CAL. CoRp. CoDE §191(a).
140. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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Section 2115 represents a legislative determination that California has a
public interest in protecting its shareholders from potential abuses by
foreign corporations. Nevertheless, this local public policy interest must
be weighed against the burden that Section 2115 creates on interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court has upheld state statutes requiring
foreign corporations to obtain a permit to engage in intrastate business
even though the corporation may at the same time be engaged in
interstate commerce.141 These statutes, however, have not had the
potential regulatory scope that Section 2115 appears to have, and there-
fore may be distinguishable. However, in light of the fact that Section
2115 applies to foreign corporations conducting intrastate commerce,
thdt intrastite regulations touching upon interstate commerce have been
sustained in the past,142 and that the states possess broad police power to
regulate foreign corporations,' 43 it appears that Section 2115 could
withstand any assertion that it unconstitutionally burdens interstate
commerce.
C. Due Process
To meet due process requirements when regulating foreign corpora-
tions, a state must establish that it has a sufficient governmental interest
to justify application of its laws. 44 In general, "a state is without power
to exercise 'extraterritorial jurisdiction' [over] activities wholly beyond
its boundaries.' 45  The standard which appears to be applied in cases
involving due process considers whether the forum state has a sufficient
governmental interest to justify its action.1 46 If it is not established that
California has a sufficient and sustained interest in a quasi-foreign
corporation before compelling it to adhere to the required level of
corporate conduct, the provision will be invalid as violating the quasi-
foreign corporation's right to due process because there will be insuffi-
cient basis for legislative jurisdiction. As discussed above, Section 2115
does not apply California law to a foreign corporation until half of its
business is conducted within the state and half of the shares are held of
record by persons having California addresses. 147  This test indicates
that the relationship between the corporation and the state is such that
141. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On Drugs, 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
142. Id.
143. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
144. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.s. 397, 408-10 (1930); Weinstein, Problems
in the Field of State Securities Regulation, 3 B.C. Ibm. & CoM. L REV. 381, 386 (1962).
145. See Watson v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70-71 (1954).
146. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930); Weinstein, Problems in the
Field of State Securities Regulation 3 B.C. RIm. & COM. L. REv. 381, 386 (1962).
147. See text accompanying notes 97-114 supra.
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the state has a substantial governmental interest in regulating the corpo-
ration to minimize the threat of harm to local shareholders and credi-
tors. Section 2115 becomes applicable to a foreign corporation only
after it has conducted repeated and successive transactions of its busi-
ness and has registered 50 percent of its voting securities to persons with
California addresses.148 Based on these two criteria, the application of
Section 2115 to foreign corporations appears not to violate the principle
that the state must have a sufficient and sustained interest in the
corporation before subjecting it to California law.
D. Full Faith and Credit
There has been much academic discussion concerning the possibility
that the full faith and credit clause may require a state to give full faith
and credit to the corporation statute of the incorporating state and
refrain from applying its own laws to the internal affairs of foreign
corporations. 149  The full faith and credit clause has been used by the
Supreme Court to avoid actual conflicts between different state regulato-
ry schemes, 5 0 the resolution of such conflicts being provided by the
constitutional command that a state recognize the "public acts, records
and judicial proceedings of every other state."'' The cases in which
the full faith and credit clause has been utilized, however, have not
dealt with the problem of the quasi-foreign corporation and do not ap-
pear to be applicable to the particular problems of this type of busi-
ness entity.'52 However, the cases have indicated that full faith and
credit must be given to another state's corporation statutes when the
dispute in the forum state is peculiarly within the incorporating state's
regulatory power.153 The commentators have equated this requirement
with a due process test mandating sufficient state interest in order to
satisfy the full faith and credit clause. 54  As discussed above, Section
148. See text accompanying notes 97-114 supra.
149. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv.
433, 445 & n.32 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]; see also Baraf, The Foreign
Corporation-A Problem in Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33 BnooK. L. Rav. 219, 240
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Baraf]; Reese and Kaufman, The Law Governing Cor-
porate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM.
L. Rn.. 1118, 1129 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reese and Kaufman].
150. Baraf, supra note 149, at 240.
151. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
152. The cases have generally concerned workers' compensation or fraternal benefit
insurance associations. As to workers' compensation, full faith and credit has been
equated with due process, and as to the fraternal benefit cases, the reasoning has been
narrowly confined to those types of organizations and does not appear applicable to com-
mercial corporations. See generally Baraf, supra note 149, at 240-47; Kaplan, supra
note 149, 445-60; Reese and Kaufman, supra note 149, at 1129-43.
153. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260 (1912).
154. See Kaplan, supra note 149, at 447; Baraf, supra note 149, at 242; and Reese
and Kaufman, supra note 149, at 1130.
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2115 does not violate due process because it is applied only after a
substantial connection with California has been demonstrated to exist.
Therefore, it appears that full faith and credit need not be afforded to
the corporation laws of the state of incorporation by California when
it regulates quasi-foreign corporations.
E. Equal Protection
The final limitation on state regulation of foreign corporations re-
quires that a state afford foreign corporations within its borders equal
protection of the laws.'55 Prior to admitting a foreign corporation,
however, a state may impose more onerous conditions than it does on
domestic corporations."' The test used to determine whether unconsti-
tutional discrimination has taken place in areas involving economic
regulation is whether or not there is any rational basis for the different
treatment. 1 7  Thus, despite their discriminatory nature, statutes that
impose conditions on the admission of foreign corporations would ap-
parently be constitutional if based upon a policy of protecting local
shareholders and creditors.1 58 Once admitted, however, foreign corpo-
rations may not be treated differently than domestic corporations. 1 9
Section 2115 appears incapable of being construed as treating foreign
corporations differently than domestic corporations. In fact, if a for-
eign corporation becomes subject to California laws under Section 2115,
it is subject only to certain specified provisions applicable to all domestic
corporations. Consequently, no basis for a denial of equal protection
appears to exist.
As between foreign corporations and quasi-foreign corporations,
there is discrimination because the foreign corporation is not subject to
California laws. However, a quasi-foreign corporation by definition has
a significant number of its shares held by persons having California
addresses. The holders of such shares should be protected by the
exercise of the state's police power. That quasi-foreign corporations are
discriminated against in the exercise of that police power appears not be
unconstitutional, since the shareholder residence test and three-factor
formula embodied in Section 2115 assure a rational basis for the appli-
cation of California law.
155. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
156. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 676-77 (1945).
157. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
158. For discussion of a state's policy of protecting shareholders and creditors, see
text accompanying notes 6-23 supra.
159. WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117, 119 (1968).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS
Section 2115 appears to pose inherent conflict-of-laws questions in
that foreign corporations may be subject to more than one state's
corporate regulatory scheme. Because the conflict-of-laws field tends to
be uncertain, no one solution has been recognized as having universal
application to every fact situation. However, certain theories and ap-
proaches have received attention by the commenators, necessitating
discussion of these ideas in relation to Section 2115.
The conflict-of-laws problems arises when a Delaware corporation
conducting its business in California such that it qualifies as a quasi-
foreign corporation becomes subject to both Delaware and California
law. If Delaware has a different regulatory philosophy than California,
the forum court might be forced to make a choice between two compet-
ing corporate statutory schemes. Before such a choice can be made,
however, it is necessary to determine whether a true conflict exists
between the laws of the interested states.'60
Professor Currie's analysis divides choice-of-law considerations into
false conflicts problems, which reveal that while an ostensible conflict
between two policies may exist, only one state has a truly legitimate
interest in the outcome of the litigation, and true conflicts problems, in
which two or more states have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the
litigation. 16 ' The false conflict situation is easily resolved by applying
the law of the interested state.16 2 In contrast, Currie states that where
both states have a legitimate interest in seeing their corporation laws
applied, the conflict-of-laws problem cannot be solved without subordi-
nating one of the -two competing state interests,' and the issue turns
to which law should be subordinated.
If the suit is commenced in California, Section 2115 operates as a
legislative directive that the court should apply California law to the
160. See B. CRU3, SELECFD ESSAYS ON THE CoNrIc OF LAws 189-90 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as CURRM].
161. Id.
162. CuRiuE, supra note 160, at 189. Hypothetically speaking, a situation in which
a Delaware corporation meeting the criteria of Section 2115 and faced with an action
in a Delaware court may give rise to a false conflict situation. In such a case, the Del-
aware court could find that the forum state has no interest other than a pecuniary inter-
est stemming from the generation of franchise taxes and fees, especially in light of that
corporation's substantial activities in California. Hence, a false conflict would exist.
On the other hand, the Delaware court may find that the legislative intent underlying
the Delaware corporation law is of a sufficient interest (i.e. to permit flexible corporate
action to benefit the business world or to attract persons to serve on corporate boards)
so as to take the lawsuit out of the false conflicts area and place it into a true conflicts
characterization.
163. Id. at 190.
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exclusion of the laws of the state of incorporation.16 4  On the other
hand, if the suit is brought in the state of incorporation and no statutory
choice-of-law directive exists in that state's general corporation law, the
forum court must determine whether it should apply its own law to its
own corporation based on the fact that the corporation is domestic, or
apply California law because California may have the predominant state
interest.
There may be an initial question as to whether a California sharehold-
er would ever have the desire or need to bring suit in a jurisdiction other
than California. Yet such a situation could conceivably arise when no
means of obtaining jurisdiction over necessary parties exists in Califor-
nia. For example, a case could arise in which a derivative suit is
brought by a California shareholder of a New Jersey corporation against
a corporate director to recover an unlawful dividend distribution. The
corporation, if found to be a quasi-foreign corporation under Section
2115, would be subject to California law regarding distribution of
assets, giving the plaintiff a cause of action against the directors for
approving such action.165  If the* director was not amenable to suit
within California, the action would presumably have commenced in
-New Jersey as the state of incorporation. Assuming that the action is
commenced in New Jersey, the above case may illustrate the classic "true
conflict' situation. The New Jersey defendant may be precisely the
person that the New Jersey laws were designed to protect;16  similarly,
the California law was clearly designed to protect the California share-
holder.1
6 7
If the forum state has no statutory directive similar to California's,
there are two basic approaches to the true conflicts problem, one stem-
ming from Professor Currie's governmental interest analysis,16 8 the oth-
er following the orientation of the Restatement Second, Conflict of
Laws, which looks to the law of the state having the "most significant
relationship" to the matter at issue. 69
164. New CAL. CORP. CODE §2115(b); see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLcr OF
LAws §6(1) (1971).
165. New CAL. CORP. CODE §§500-505, 309, 316 as applied through New CAL.
CoRP. CODE §2115(b).
166. The New Jersey corporate policy is explicit: the corporation laws of New Jer-
sey are to be interpreted in as liberal a manner as possible in order to encourage
incorporation in the state. N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A, at xi (1968) (N.J. Corporation Law
Revision Commission, Report on the New Jersey Corporation Law).
167. California's policy seems just as explicit: California shareholders and cred-
itors are to be protected from the activities of quasi-foreign corporations by subjecting
such corporations to specified provisions of the New California Corporations Code. CAL-
IFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITmE ON THE REVISION OF THE CORPO-
RATIONS CODE, REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THEB
CORPoRATIONs CODE 106 (Dec. 1, 1975).
168. CtVrnR, supra note 160, at 188-89.
169. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§6, 145, 188, 270(b) (1971).
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The first approach, Currie's governmental interest analysis, 70 sug-
gests that once the forum court has determined that a true conflicts
situation has arisen, it should apply its own law to the facts of the case.
Thus, if the New Jersey court in the hypothetical suit against the director
were to follow Currie's approach, it would first determine that Califor-
nia and New Jersey have competing interests in regulating the action of
corporate directors, and would then apply New Jersey law in reaching its
final decision. The rationale behind this approach is based on the
concept that the rational pursuit of self-interest is preferable to irrational
altruism, and that it is not a court's function to balance policies estab-
lished by the legislature."17 Currie asserts that since no traditional
choice-of-law rule appears to predictably solve the true conflicts prob-
lem, a state is best off applying its own law, instead of attempting to
further the interests of another state by applying that state's law.
72
While governmental interest analysis solves the problem of which law
to apply, it fails to deal with the more basic problem of choosing the
corporate ideology best suited to an equitable solution of the case.
Governmental interest analysis suggests that the forum state automati-
cally subordinate the interests of another state to its own interest,
without regard to the legitimate policies articulated in the other state's
corporation law."73 Thus, if a director of a New Jersey corporation
subject to Section 2115 violates California law, he might be able to
escape liability because of a choice-of-law rule subordinating an argua-
bly more compelling policy protecting shareholder interests. Conse-
quently, governmental interest analysis appears to be a less desirable
choice-of-law method in corporate conflict-of-laws problems."Y4
The second approach to the true conflicts situation attempts to apply
the law of the state having the "most significant relationship" to the
matter at issue."'5 In choosing between two competing regulatory
philosophies, the Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws suggests that
the forum court consider certain criteria in deciding true conflict of laws
problems." 06 Such factors include the forum court's corporate policies,
170. CURRI, supra note 160, at 188-89.
171. Id. at 182.
172. Id. at 191.
173. It may be argued that the state court has no business examining the corporate
policies of another state for its possible use because such examinations constitute a legis-
lative, rather than judicial, function. However, if the court is faced with a true conflicts
situation, without legislative direction, it must come to a decision based upon its notions
fairness and equity. Consequently, a true usurpation of the legislative function' could
arguably occur only where the legislature has been silent on the conflicts problem.
174. Interestingly, Currie recognizes that his approach is not a true solution to the
problem. He suggests that Congress step in to resolve the conflict. CURuI, supra note
160, at 272.
175. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§6, 145, 188, 270(b) (1971).
176. REsrATEmENT (SECOND), CONFLICrOF LAWS §6 (1971).
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the corporate policies of the state in which the corporation is considered
quasi-foreign, the protection of the justified expectations of the parties,
and the certainty and uniformity of results in subsequent cases.
77
In determining the importance of the forum's corporate policies, a
court should examine the purposes for which the particular corporate
provisions were enacted and whether they were intended to be applied to
out-of-state facts. When a domestic corporation subject to the forum
state's laws is also subject to California laws as a quasi-foreign corpora-
tion, the forum court should ascertain the purposes underlying the
regulation of corporate activity, which calls for an examination of the
philosophy of the corporate regulations. The court may find that the
legislative purpose of a particular provision is to encourage local
incorporation to generate revenue from franchise fees, or that the de-
mands of the modem business world dictate a flexible regulatory scheme
to enhance corporate competition.
At the other end of the spectrum, the court might determine that
shareholders and creditors should be protected from questionable prac-
tices by corporations, or that corporations should be forced to maintain
certain minimum standards of conduct as a condition of existence. Once
the local policy has been ascertained, the forum court should determine
if the policy was intended to apply to the corporation regardless of
where it conducts its business. If the purposes sought to be achieved by
a local corporation statute would be furthered by its application to out-
of-state transactions, there is good reason why the forum may apply its
own law.178 On the other hand, if no such purpose can be found, the
state is under no duty to apply its law.Y79 However, the interstate nature
of many corporations would seem to require application of a state's
corporation law regardless of where the transaction or event occurred.
Otherwise, there would be no effective regulation of corporation ac-
tivity unless that activity was local in nature. Thus, while no specific
legislative intent may be found to support a corporation statute's appli-
cation to an out-of-state situation, the forum court could reasonably
find its law applicable to a corporation regardless of where the activity
occurs.
The Restatement also states that the forum court should con-
sider the regulatory philosophy of other interested states.180 Since Sec-
tion 2115 subjects certain foreign corporations to minimum standards
177. Id.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLICr OF LAWS §6, at 14 (Comment e) (1971).
179. Id.
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF lAWS §6(2) (c) (1971).
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of corporate conduct in California, California's policy of protecting
shareholders and creditors should be recognized and compared to the
policies established by the forum court's legislature.
Another Restatement factor directs the forum court to determine
what the justified expectations of the parties were when they incor-
porated in the forum state while intending to conduct business in Cali-
fornia.' 81 It would be unfair and improper to hold a person liable
under the local law of one state when he had justifiably molded his
conduct to conform to the requirements of another state.' 82 However,
the forum court should determine whether the parties complied with
the conduct required in the state where they intended to do business,
or instead, intended to rely upon the standards of the state of incor-
poration as guidance for their activities. Such a determination could
shed light on the justified expectations of the parties, and should pur-
poseful evasion of one state's corporation laws become apparent, the
lack of good faith should be a weighty factor in determining which state
law to apply.
Predictability and uniformity of results by the courts in general is
another Restatement factor the forum court should weigh in determin-
ing which corporation law to apply.'8 3 Where people give advance
thought to the legal consequences of their transactions, particularly
in the corporate field, predictability and uniformity of result in court
decisions is of critical importance. Business in general is conducted
under the assumption that the law will demand certain and predict-
able types of performance in -the future. Thus, a plaintiff before
the forum court, urging application of California laws, could rea-
sonably argue that a corporation subject to Section 2115 should be
subject to California law when the facts indicate that no uncertainty ex-
ists as to the applicability of California law. On the other hand, the de-
fendant could argue that since the forum court is dealing with a domestic
corporation, if it applied foreign law, it would disrupt local corporate
practices because of the uncertainty engendered by the application of
local law to transactions occurring outside the state.'8 4 In addition,
the defendant could argue that application of foreign law in an area
regulated by the state legislature may be a violation of the separation of
powers at the state level. However the arguments are articulated, the
forum court will have to weigh the impact of applying California law
181. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLict OF LAws §6(2)(d) and Comment g
(1971).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws §6, Comment g (1971).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICr OF LAWS §6, Comment i (1971).
184. See text accompanying notes 115-126 supra.
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to its own corporations through Section 2115 against the impact appli-
cation of its law will have on California policy. Again, the court must
engage in a balancing of the state policies.
In general, it can be said that the Restatement approach appears to
provide a less mechanical method for determining the appropriate law to
be applied by the forum court than does Professor Currie's governmen-
tal interest analysis approach. From a pragmatic standpoint, however,
it does not seem likely that a foreign court would apply California law to
one of its own corporations, regardless of the interest California may
have in the outcome. In whatever manner the forum court articulates a
"balancing of state policies", the realistic attorney should expect that the
forum court would come -to the decision it finds to be in its best interests
on a case by case basis. Consequently, there appears to be no current
approach that can give a reliable indication of which law will be applied
in any given true conflicts problem.
CONCLUSION
California has had a continuing policy of protecting its shareholders
and creditors from foreign corporations incorporating outside of Califor-
nia but returning to establish their corporate domiciles. The concept of
the quasi-foreign corporation was judicially evolved in response to this
phenomenon to compel corporations doing a substantial amount of their
business in California to comply with the California corporation law.
After World War II, the regulatory function was shifted to the Commis-
sioner of Corporations through his broad power over the issuance of
securities. Because the decision in Western Air Lines v. Sobieski made
the standards for finding a corporation to be a quasi-foreign too nebu-
lous, the regulatory power of the Commissioner was substantially limited
in the Corporate Securities Law of 1968. Between 1968 and 1975,
however, statistics from the Department of Corporations indicated that
there had been a tremendous increase in the number of small or inter-
mediate-sized foreign corporations seeking to issue securities in Califor-
nia. In response to this influx of foreign corporations, Section 2115 of
the New General Corporation Law has been enacted to provide that if a
foreign corporation conducts half of its business in California and has
half of its shares held of record by persons with California addresses, it
will be subject to specified provisions of the California corporation law
to the exclusion of the laws of the state of incorporation. Section 2115
does not appear to present constitutional problems, but may create un-
certainty if other states also claim an interest in regulating the quasi-
foreign corporation. In such situations, the forum court will have to de-
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termine if a true confliot arises and then apply the law of -the state having
the most substantial interest in regulating the corporation. On the whole,
Section 2115 appears to be a step in the direction of increasing corpo-
rate accountability to shareholders and creditors, but its ultimate impact
on the business community in California should be reassessed if future
events demonstrate that uncertainty and frustration in corporate plan-
ning outweigh any danger to shareholders and creditors.
Douglas E. Noll
